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2003 Terrorism and the Constitution
Book Review
Terrorism and the Constitution:
Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the
Name of National Security
George C. Harrist
TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME
OF NATIONAL SECURITY. By David Cole & James X. Dempsey.tft New York:
The New Press, Second Edition, 2002.
Introduction
First published in 1999 and updated in a post-9/11 second edition, Terror-
ism and the Constitution by David Cole and James Dempsey addresses an
issue now at the forefront of national debate: must we as a nation tolerate
diminished civil liberties, political freedom and privacy in order to protect
ourselves against the threat of terrorism that has now hit home with such
devastating force? Cole and Dempsey attempt to put that question in the
historical context of our response to other perceived threats to national
security, including, most notably, the Cold War threat of international
communism and the reaction to that threat in the form of 1950s McCarthy-
ism. They chart the pendulum of recovery from the surveillance excesses
of earlier eras and watch as it swings back again in what they characterize
as mistaken overreaction to the current threat from ideologically-motivated
terrorists.
Their thesis, rooted in classic First Amendment doctrine and undeter-
red by the tragedy of 9/11, is a straightforward call to stay the liberal
course of civil liberty: "we should focus on perpetrators of crime, avoid
indulging in guilt by association, maintain procedures designed to identify
the guilty and exonerate the innocent, insist on legal limits on surveillance
authorities, and bar political spying."' To do otherwise, they argue is not
only unnecessary and unconstitutional but "may well prove counter-
productive in the fight against terrorism." 2 An antiterrorism policy that
"cuts corners constitutionally" by focusing on ideology rather than evi-
t Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law; J.D., 1982, Yale Law School;
M.A.T., 1997, Brown University; B.A., 1974, Yale College. Mr. Harris is currently a
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it David Cole is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University; James X. Dempsey is
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1. DAVID COLE &JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION, at x (2nd ed.
The New Press 2002) (1999) [hereinafter COLE & DEMPSEY].
2. Id. at xi.
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dence of criminal conduct will likely be ineffective and even contribute to
violence; it will fail to adapt quickly enough to the changing face of terror-
ism (from white separatists one day to Islamic fundamentalists the next), 3
lose the essential cooperation of targeted social groups and take away the
safety valve of non-violent dissent.4
The authors focus largely on the conduct of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that they contend has historically relied on guilt by associa-
tion and has systematically violated First Amendment freedoms of speech
and association by engaging in counterintelligence against social, ideologi-
cal and political groups rather than confining its investigations to sus-
pected criminal activity. They advocate a "criminal model" that
distinguishes criminal conduct from political activity and requires suspi-
cion of actual involvement in past, ongoing or planned criminal conduct as
the necessary predicate for launching an investigation.
This second edition of the book, apparently completed in late 2001,
catalogs how the PATRIOT Act, 5 passed by a hasty Congress in the wake of
9/11, has given further momentum to prosecutions, indefinite detentions
and deportations that are often conducted in secret and based on associa-
tion rather than criminal conduct. The authors could not have fully antici-
pated, however, the degree to which the "criminal model" would give way
in the months following 9/11 not only to political monitoring, counter-
intelligence, and ethnic targeting, but to a "war model" in which a sus-
pected terrorist, without even a showing of probable cause to believe that
he has committed a crime, may be held indefinitely in military detention as
an "enemy combatant ' 6 or assassinated by a military missile attack. 7 One
wonders if the authors would be able to chart this development along the
trajectory they draw from the 1996 anti-terrorism legislation to the post-9/
11 PATRIOT Act or if they would find instead that this blurring of the dis-
3. The authors point out:
As soon as the FBI launched a massive campaign against Muslim fundamental-
ists in the wake of the World Trade Center bombing, the Murrah building in
Oklahoma City was blown up by white, native born ex-GIs. And while the FBI
and the INS pursued innocent Arab and Muslim political activists, terrorists,
careful to avoid any showing of religious or political orientation, planned and
carried out the September 11 attacks. Id. at 183.
One might add that, as investigation after 9/11 focused on anyone with possible links to
al Qaeda, deadly anthrax mailings and the Washington D.C.-area sniper attacks were
apparently perpetrated by persons with no such links.
4. Id. at 15-16.
5. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56
(2001).
6. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dis-
cussion of Padilla case, infra at pp. 113-115).
7. CNN News, Sources: U.S. kills Cole suspect, Nov. 5, 2002 ("CIA drone launched a
'Hellfire' missile" and struck the car in which six suspected al Qaeda members were
traveling, killing them all), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/11/04/
yemen.blast/index.html; see also BBC News, CIA 'Killed al-Qaeda Suspects' in Yemen,
Nov. 5, 2002 ("America's CIA carried out an attack in Yemen that killed six suspected
members of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network"), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/mid-
dleeast/2402479.stm.
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tinction between civil law enforcement and military action represents a
new and distinct challenge to the primacy of the "criminal model" as the
proper focus for our response to the threat of terrorism.
The basic premise of Terrorism, unchanged in its post-9/11 second
edition, is that the current threat of terrorism is not so different in magni-
tude or kind from past threats to our national security that it should deter
us from the basic path of civil liberty and due process, even in the pursuit
of the terrorist perpetrators, or that it can justify a repetition of extreme
measures taken in prior eras that are now generally discredited. The
authors argue that the current threat posed by terrorism is certainly no
greater than that posed by the Soviet-led communist design for world domi-
nation. And it was in the context of that threat that the Supreme Court
firmly established the principle that criminal prosecutions must proceed
on the principle of individual culpability-specific intent to further illegal
activity-not guilt by association.
The authors do not, however, confront directly the full force of post-9/
11 arguments for the uniqueness of the present threat. The communist
bloc never mounted an attack on U.S. soil resulting in the deaths of
thousands of innocent civilians. As a nation, we have little context for such
trauma other than perhaps the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which led
to the internment of 110,000 Americans of Japanese descent with the
Supreme Court's stamp of approval. With the identification of a primary
and identifiable, if loosely confederated, enemy-Usama bin Laden's al
Qaeda organization-and the actual militarization of the "war" on terror-
ism, the proponents of extraordinary measures have added to their consti-
tutional arsenal the formidable force of the president's "war power." Such
is the changed climate of constitutional debate, not entirely anticipated by
the authors even in their post-9/11 edition, that the decision of a federal
district court holding that a suspected terrorist can be held in indefinite
military detention based on "some evidence" of association with al Qaeda 8
is hailed by many as a victory of civil liberty, simply because the suspect
will be allowed to have assistance of counsel. 9
I. Investigating Crimes, Not Groups
Terrorism presents an array of twentieth century exemplars to demonstrate
the folly of the FBI's historical penchant for investigating political or other
groups and engaging in "counterintelligence" in the absence of any specific
8. Padilla, 233 F. Supp.2d at 608.
9. See discussion of Padilla case, infra at 113-115; see also Andrew Cohen, Lawyers
Win Access to Padilla, Dec. 5, 2002 (stating that "[a]ctually, the decision is more
favorable to Padilla than it is to the White House. His lawyers have the power to argue
on his behalf, the court noted, and Padilla has the right to see those attorneys so that,
together, they can better challenge the government's decision to detain him as an enemy
combatant."), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/04/news/opinion/court
watch/main531784.shtml; see also American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Calls Victory
for Right to CouInsel in Eneiny Combatant Case Positive Step, Dec. 4, 2002 (heralding deci-
sion as "a clear rebuke of the Bush Administration and a victory for civil liberties.") at
http://www.aclu.org.
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evidence of illegal conduct. The authors present in their introductory
chapter the following four stories to demonstrate "the recurring nature of
the government's misguided response to political threats": the 1950s
McCarthy era investigation and prosecution of Frank Wilkinson, founder
of what is now the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation; the
COINTELPRO surveillance of protest movements during the 1960s and
70s, including environmental activists, Vietnam protesters and women's
liberation advocates; the investigation of Central American activists,
including the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador
("CISPES") during the 1980s; and the investigation of Palestinians and
Muslims, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
("PFLP") during the 1990s.10 The authors devote a chapter each to the
investigation of CISPES and the investigation and attempted deportation of
the PFLP "Los Angeles 8" and a chapter to intelligence investigations of
various other groups, such as Amnesty International, Earth First and the
"library awareness project" through which the FBI has monitored the read-
ing interests of selected ethnic groups. Cole and Dempsey argue that the
FBI has repeatedly devoted enormous resources to monitoring and investi-
gating legitimate political activity, resulting in a substantial chilling effect
on their targets' First Amendment rights of freedom of association and
speech and few, if any, prosecutions of actual criminal activity.
Terrorism then tells the story of the historical push and shove to define
the proper limits of the FBI's investigative authority-"the ongoing struggle
between control and discretion, between efforts to limit monitoring of
political dissent and efforts to preserve or extend FBI powers."" One
gauge of these limits is the Justice Department's evolving guidelines.
Guidelines issued by Attorney General Edward Levi in 1976 "required sus-
picion of criminal conduct before a domestic security investigation was
opened."' 2 Under Ronald Reagan, however, Attorney General William
French Smith changed those guidelines to allow investigations based on
mere advocacy of crime, or of "activities that 'may lead to ... serious dis-
ruptions of society,"' a standard that the authors argue "would easily
encompass investigations of both the civil rights and the anti-Vietnam War
movements."13
The authors chronicle how during "the 1980s and 1990s, FBI powers
were again extended in the name of foreign counterintelligence and antiter-
rorism."' 4 After the Oklahoma City bombing, an interpretative memoran-
dum from the Justice Department, negotiated by FBI Director Louis Freeh,
served to further relax the application of the Attorney General's domestic
security guidelines. Under this new interpretation, "the number of domes-
tic open security investigations rose from approximately 100 in 1995 to
10. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 5-9.
11. Id. at 89.
12. Id. at 79.
13. Id. at 80-81.
14. Id. at 89.
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more than 800 in 1997."' 15
Guidelines governing counterintelligence and international terrorism
investigations provide even more latitude for investigation of political activ-
ity, and the FBI's ability to gather information in the name of anti-terrorism
was greatly expanded by the post-9/11 PATRIOT Act, which authorizes the
seizures of records and things "'to protect against international terrorism
or clandestine intelligence activities"' without regard to any evidence of
criminal activity. 16 By eliminating the requirement that the records or
wiretap surveillance sought pertain to the agent of a foreign power, the Act
allows the FBI to compel disclosure of any record that it determines is rele-
vant to the investigation of international terrorism. As the authors explain:
Previously, the FBI could get the credit card records of anyone suspected of
being a foreign agent. Under the PATRIOT Act, the FBI can get the entire
database of the credit card company. Under prior law, the FBI could get
library-borrowing records only by complying with state law, and always had
to ask for the records of a specific patron. Under the PATRIOT Act, the FBI
can go into a public library and ask for the records on everybody who ever
used the library, or who used it on a certain day, or who checked out certain
kinds of books. It can do the same at any bank, telephone company, hotel or
motel, hospital, or university-merely upon the claim that the information is
"sought for" an investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.] 7
The government obtains warrants for such searches from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") court,' 8 which meets in secret and
whose decisions are subject to little or no review. 19 The FISA court has
denied only one of approximately 10,000 warrant applications sought
since its inception in 1978.20 The Foreign Intelligence Court of Review,
which rarely meets, has already approved the Justice Department's
expanded surveillance powers under the PATRIOT Act and the use of intel-
ligence surveillance in the prosecution of persons accused of being
terrorists. 2 1
Terrorism concludes noting that "[als we enter 2002 engaged in a
global struggle against terrorism, the FBI's powers to engage in political
spying remain largely unrestricted by statute or executive regulation." 22 It
must come as no surprise to the authors that the Ashcroft Justice Depart-
15. Id. at 83.
16. Id. at 166 (quoting the USA PATRIOT Act, Section 215, amending 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1862 & 1863).
17. Id. at 167.
18. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2003).
19. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Acts to Use New Power to Spy on Possible Terrorists, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at 1. ("The Justice Department, moving quickly to use its
expanded powers for spying on possible terrorists, plans to assign federal lawyers in
counterintelligence to terrorism task forces in New York and Washington to help secure
secret warrants against suspects, officials say.").
20. See Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Secret Court Goes on Extra Duty, (Oct. 12, 2001), at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,36308,00.html.
21. Lichtblau, supra note 19, at 1.
22. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 89.
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ment has continued to push the envelope. On May 30, 2002, Attorney
General Ashcroft announced a new version of the guidelines governing FBI
domestic surveillance. By emphasizing the need for preventive investiga-
tion "to neutralize terrorists before they are able to strike," the new guide-
lines further sever the tie between evidence of crime and authorization for
investigation and clear the way for surveillance of religious and political
groups, Internet chat rooms and other forums for social gathering. 2 3 Simi-
lar efforts have been undertaken to remove restrictions on investigations by
local law enforcement authorities. 24
With the militarization of the "war" on terrorism, however, the FBI no
longer poses the only, or perhaps even the greatest, threat to Americans'
privacy and First Amendment freedoms. The Defense Department is
reportedly proceeding with a Total Information Awareness Project (the
"TIAP") that would search data from various databases, including tele-
phone records, credit card transactions, travel information, medical records
and library records, in the search for potential terrorists. 2 5 This program,
and the FBI's interest in the program, 2 6 have attracted some legislative con-
cern though only in the form of a proposed reporting requirement. 2 7
23. See U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet, Attorney General's Guidelines:
Detecting and Preventing Terrorist Attacks, May 30, 2002 (specifying that agents may
engage in online research and use commercial data mining services "even when not
linked to an individual criminal investigation"; agents may "enter any public place that is
open to other citizens"; "investigations of suspected terrorists with ties to religious and
political organizations will proceed according to the principle of neutrality.") at http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/53002factsheet.htm.
24. See Michael Moss & Ford Fessenden, New Tools for Domestic Spying, and Qualms,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at Al ("From New York to Seattle, police officials are looking
to do away with rules that block them from spying on people and groups without evi-
dence that a crime has been committed. They say these rules, forced on them in the
1970s and '80s to halt abuses, prevent them from infiltrating mosques and other settings
where terrorists might plot." According to the press report, "[V]hen the Federal Bureau
of Investigation grew concerned this spring [2002] that terrorists might attack using
scuba gear, it set out to identify every person who had taken diving lessons in the previ-
ous three years.").
25. See, e.g., Alan Gathright, U.S. Evolving into Big Brother Society, ACLU Says, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 16, 2003, at A4; see also John Markoff &John Schwartz, Bush Administra-
tion to Propose System for Wide Monitoring of Internet, N.Y. TIwES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A22
("The Bush administration is planning to propose requiring Internet service providers to
help build a centralized system to enable broad monitoring of the Internet and, poten-
tially, surveillance of its users.").
26. See Curt Anderson, FBI's Possible Involvement In Pentagon Data Project Raises
New Privacy Questions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21, 2003.
27. In January of 2003, the Senate passed a measure that would halt the develop-
ment of the program absent required reporting about the program, including its impact
on privacy and civil liberties. See Data Mining May Be Attached to Omnibus Budget Reso-
lution, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Jan. 17, 2003, available at http://wwxv.nexis.com. This
measure has been agreed to by House conferees, but its fate remains uncertain because
of its inclusion in a larger spending bill. See Adam Clymer, Congress Agrees to Bar Penta-
gon From Terror Watch of Americans, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 12, 2003, at Al ("The on])' obsta-
cles to the provision becoming law would be the failure of the negotiators to reach an
agreement on the overall spending bill in which it is included, or a successful veto by
President Bush of the bill.").
Vol. 36
2003 Terrorism and the Constitution
The motivations and justifications for these increased invasions of pri-
vacy and incursions on civil liberties all derive, of course, from the seem-
ingly unassailable proposition that our response to terrorism should not
focus on punishment but on prevention. In arguing for the adequacy of the
"criminal model" and against this increased emphasis on intelligence and
surveillance, the authors of Terrorism swim against the tide of national
trauma, anxiety and fear that is the very aim of the terrorist enemies and
the fruit of their horrific acts.
The authors assert, however, that the current expansion of govern-
ment surveillance is unnecessary and even counter-productive to the effort
to prevent terrorism. They point out that the 9/11 hijackers "had no overt
political inclinations [and] they never engaged in the type of political or
associational activity that the FBI has traditionally made the focus of its
counterterrorism efforts. ' '28 Ethnic profiling, they argue, is not only con-
stitutionally prohibited because it is not narrowly tailored to accomplish its
anti-terrorist purpose, it is also ineffective:
When one treats a whole group of people as presumptively suspicious, it
means that agents are more likely to miss dangerous persons who take care
not to fit the profile. In addition, the fact that the vast majority of those
suspected on the basis of their Arab or Muslim appearance are innocent will
inevitably cause agents to let their guard down. Overbroad generalizations,
in other words, are problematic not only because they constitute an unjusti-
fied imposition on innocents, but because they undermine effective law
enforcement. 2
9
Targeting of certain groups and communities will also, the authors
contend, alienate those communities and inhibit the kind of communica-
tion and cooperation necessary to effectively identify and thwart potential
terrorists. "If we have reason to believe that there are potential terrorist
threats within the Arab and Muslim community in the United States, we
should be seeking ways to work with the millions of law-abiding members
of those communities to help identify the true threats, not treating the
entire community as suspect. "'30
That less is actually more when it comes to preventing terrorism will,
however, undoubtedly continue to be a hard sell to elected officials whose
greatest fear, other than terrorism itself, is the prospect that they could be
perceived to have not done enough when the next strike hits. In the first
edition of Terrorism, published in 1999, the authors suggested that the
threat of a massive terrorist attack might be overblown:
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical about the claim that terrorists
or their weapons have changed qualitatively in ways that justify a curtail-
ment of civil liberties. First, there is reason to question the claim that ter-
rorists today "know no bounds." Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad, for
example, have been engaged for many years in terrorism motivated in part
by concepts of religious martyrdom, yet they have strategically targeted and
28. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 167.
29. Id. at 170.
30. Id.
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timed their attacks to further their political agenda, and have not sought
mass destruction.
31
Pointing to Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City bombing, they
also noted "the emergence of the lone terrorist, the member of no known
group."32 These passages seem eerily dated now and are, for obvious rea-
sons, not included in the current edition.
In their defense, the authors also argued in the first edition that the
curtailments of civil liberties present in 1999 would not be justified or
effective even assuming a "qualitatively different threat today."33 They also
take credit in the current, post-9/11 edition for having "correctly warned
that the federal anti-terrorism effort was flawed and ill-suited to meet the
terrorist threat."'3 4 Nonetheless, while it does not necessarily undermine
the logic of the authors' position about an effective anti-terrorism policy,
the overwhelming devastation of 9/11 and the emergence of Usama bin
Laden's al Qaeda as the identifiable enemy in a global "war" effort has
certainly changed the environment in which this debate must take place.
The argument for a "criminal model" for the investigation and prevention
of terrorism is much more heavily burdened in such an environment, espe-
cially if one accepts the concept that we are now at war with the terrorist
perpetrators.
I. Guilt by Association and the War on Terrorism
Terrorism focuses a great deal of its attention on the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("1996 Anti-Terrorism Act"), 3 5 passed
in the wake of the World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City
federal building bombing (which "overwhelmed all rational discussion"
about the proposed legislation), 36 and the PATRIOT Act, passed little more
than a month after the 9/11 attacks. In the view of the authors, this legisla-
tion is a largely misguided overreaction to the threat of terrorism that
severely and unnecessarily compromises our civil liberties.
The 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the PATRIOT Act and
codified at 18 U.S.C. section 2339B, makes it a crime punishable to up to
15 years in prison to provide "material support or resources" to any organi-
zation designated by the Secretary of State as a "foreign terrorist organiza-
tion. ' ' 3 7 "Material support or resources" is defined to include:
[Clurrency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial ser-
vices, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false docu-
mentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons,
31. JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 152 (First
Amendment Foundation 1999).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at x.
35. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
36. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 108.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2003).
Vol. 36
2003 Terrorism and the Constitution
lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious materials.
38
Section 2339 thereby creates a complete prohibition on financial as well as
other assistance to a designated organization and its prohibition on provid-
ing "personnel" arguably includes even mere membership.3 9
For purposes of these criminal penalties, "terrorism" is, in the authors'
view, whatever the Secretary of State decides it is. 40 The Secretary has
authority to designate a foreign group as a "terrorist organization" if the
Secretary concludes that the group engages in "terrorist activity" that is a
threat to the "national security of the United States."' 4 1 "Terrorist activity"
is broadly defined to include virtually any unlawful use of, or threat to use,
a weapon against person or property, unless for mere personal monetary
gain. 4 2 "National security" is also broadly defined to mean "national
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States."' 43 In
making these findings, the Secretary can use almost any source, including
"third hand accounts, press stories, material on the Internet or other hear-
say regarding the organization's activities,"4 4 or secret, classified mate-
rial.4 5 The designation is subject to limited court review.4 6 The statute
also does not allow the defendant in a 2339B criminal proceeding to con-
test the designation of the subject organization. It is essentially a strict
liability crime.
Characterizing 2339B as criminalizing support for humanitarian and
political activities, the authors argue that prohibiting material support to
terrorist organizations was "unnecessary" because it was already illegal to
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
39. See United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp.2d 565, 567 (E.D.Va. 2002). John
Walker Lindh was charged with providing material support in the form of "personnel" to
al Qaeda and to another designated organization, Harakat ul-Mujahadin, based on hav-
ing attended training camps allegedly conducted by those organizations.
40. COLE & DEMPSFY, supra note 1, at 119-20.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2003).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii)(V)(b) (2003). It includes, for example, "the use of
any explosive, firearm . . . (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to
endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause sub-
stantial damage to property."
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2) (2003).
44. People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
45. See Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
46. COLE & DFMPSEY, supra note 1, at 121 (noting that "a court can set aside the
determination only if it finds it to be 'arbitrary' or 'capricious,' unconstitutional, or
'short of statutory right,"' the authors describe the Secretary's designation determina-
tion as effectively unreviewable). In National Council of Resistance of Iran, however, the
D.C. Circuit held that the designation of the organizations at issue violated due process.
Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 209. The court emphasized "the dearth of
procedural participation and protection afforded the designated entity," which provided
no notice of or opportunity to participate in the designation process. Id. at 196. Rather
than revoking the designation, however, the court remanded to the Secretary for further
proceedings. Id. at 209.
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aid or abet in the criminal conduct of such organizations. 4 7 They point out
that had this law been in effect in the 1980s, "it would have been a crime to
give money to the African National Congress [ANC] during Nelson
Mandela's speaking tours [in the United States] because the State Depart-
ment routinely listed the ANC as a 'terrorist group."' 4 8 Even groups more
popularly associated with terrorism may also be substantially engaged in
other political or humanitarian activities. According to the authors, "[tihe
Israeli government itself estimates that Hamas devotes 95 percent of its
resources to legal social service activity and only 5 percent to violent or
military activity."
49
This and other provisions of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act, the authors
contend, "reintroduced to federal law the principle of 'guilt by association'
that had defined the McCarthy era."50 They argue that the Act violates the
First Amendment principle, developed in the communist party cases in the
1960s 5 1 and that the government cannot punish a person for associating
with an organization, even one that engages in illegal activity, absent a spe-
cific intent to further the organization's unlawful purposes:
Simply put, the fundraising ban of the 1996 Antiterrorism Act ignores what
has long been a fundamental precept of our constitutional law-that a "blan-
ket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal
aims," without a showing of specific intent to further the unlawful aims of
the group, is an unconstitutional infringement on "the cherished freedom of
association protected by the First Amendment .... 52
David Cole made this argument as counsel in Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject v. Reno53 [hereinafter HLP], in which he represented groups seeking to
enjoin enforcement of Section 2339B. The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected
this argument in a pre-9/ 11 opinion by Judge Kozinski. While finding that
Section 2339B's prohibitions on providing "personnel" and "training" were
47. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 121-22.
48. Id. at 118.
49. Id. at 155.
50. Id. at 118.
51. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (holding, in the con-
text of alleged association with communist organizations, that the Smith Act's prohibi-
tion on organizing, being a member of or affiliating with an organization that advocates
the violent overthrow of the U.S. government should be construed to punish such associ-
ation only with "clear proof that a defendant 'specifically intend[s] to accomplish (the
aims of the organization) by resort to violence."') (quoting Noto v. United States 367
U.S. 290, 299 (1961)); Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964) (striking
down provisions of statute that prohibited members of a communist organization from
applying for or using a passport because the statute, among other things, did not require
any specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the organization); Elfbrandt v. Rus-
sell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1.966) (holding unconstitutional Arizona statute that permitted
prosecution for perjury and discharge from office of person who took an oath to the
United States but knowingly and willfully became or remained a member of the Com-
munist party: "[l]aws such as this which are not restricted in scope to those who join
with the 'specific intent' to further illegal action impose, in effect, a conclusive presump-
tion that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organization.").
52. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 123 (quoting Elfbrandt, 384 U.S. at 15, 18)
(quoting Scales, 367 U.S. at 229).
53. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d, 1130 (2000).
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unconstitutionally void for vagueness and upholding a preliminary injunc-
tion on enforcement of those parts of the statute, 5 4 the court was unwilling
"to characterize the statute as imposing guilt by association":
The statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the designated
groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of the
group. Plaintiffs are even free to praise the groups for using terrorism as a
means of achieving their ends. What [the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act] prohib-
its is the act of giving material support, and there is no constitutional right
to facilitate terrorism by giving terrorists the weapons and explosives with
which to carry out their grisly missions. Nor, of course is there a right to
provide resources with which terrorists can buy weapons and explosives. 5 5
Relying on a Congressional finding incorporated into the statute "that
'foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates
that conduct,"' and reasoning that money is fungible, the HLP court found
that "all material support given to such organizations aids their unlawful
goals."'56 The Ninth Circuit thereby held, in effect, that the Secretary of
State's finding that an organization is "terrorist" is a constitutionally suita-
ble surrogate for the normally required finding of specific intent to further
illegal activity.
The HLP holding thus puts extraordinary constitutional pressure on
the designation process, a process that leaves much room for arbitrariness.
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, in National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Depart-
ment of State,57 held that the Secretary's designation process did not meet
the minimum requirements of due process. That process provides no
notice to the organization or its members and no opportunity to com-
ment. 58 The Secretary is free to rely on "third hand accounts, press stories,
material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the organization's activ-
ities" 59 and "classified material, to which the organization has no access at
any point during or after the proceeding." 60 The D.C. Circuit did not, how-
ever, void the designation of the National Council of Resistance of Iran
("NCRI") as a terrorist organization but instead remanded it to the Secre-
tary for further proceedings. 6 1
Judge Takasugi in the Central District of California was troubled
enough by these circumstances, despite the decision in HLP, to dismiss the
indictment in United States v. Rahmani that alleges that the defendants have
54. Id. at 1137-38.
55. Id. at 1133.
56. Id. at 1136 (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1248).
57. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F,3d at 196.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 182 F.3d at 19) (internal quotations
omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 209.
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provided material support and resources to the NCRI. 62 The court found
that because the designation of the organization was obtained in violation
of due process, "[it] is a nullity and cannot serve as a predicate in a prose-
cution for violation of Section 2339B."6 3 Rahmani is now on appeal in the
Ninth Circuit.
Terrorism notes that the government was slow in implementing some
central aspects of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act and that as of publication,
"the government had prosecuted only three cases involving material sup-
port to terrorist organizations '64 in the entire history of the Act. In the
further aftermath of 9/11, however, 2339B has received considerably more
attention. Since the publishing of this edition, John Walker Lindh, the
Lackwanna defendants, the Portland defendants and the University of
South Florida computer engineering professor, Sami A-Arian, among
others, have all been charged with material support to designated foreign
terrorist organizations. 6 5
More fundamentally, however, in ways that the authors could not per-
haps have thoroughly anticipated in the days immediately following 9/11,
the government's anti-terrorism effort has shifted its focus from prosecu-
62. United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The
People's Mojahedin of Iran ("PMOI") is dedicated to the overthrow of the current regime
in Iran. Defendants are accused of raising money for the organization. The government
alleges, for example, that defendant, Roya Rahmani, attended fundraising meetings and
solicited and accepted donations (about $200) on behalf of the PMOI. If convicted of
that charge, Ms. Rahmani faces up to ten years in prison. Under the PATRIOT Act the
maximum sentence was increased to fifteen years. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56; § 810(d)(1), 115 Stat 272, 380. Because of the "terrorist" enhancement in the
sentencing guidelines, even first-time offenders will typically be subject to the maximum
penalties. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, there is a twelve-level upward adjust-
ment if the offense involved or was intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism. 18
U.S.C. § 3A1.4 (2003). The defendant's criminal history category is also automatically a
Category VI even for a first-time offender who would otherwise fit in Category I. Id.; see
United States v. Leahy, 169 F.3d 433, 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
63. Id. at 1059.
64. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 127.
65. Gordon Fairclough, U.S. 's Zero-Tolerance Policy on Terror Suspects is Tested: New
Emphasis on Pre-Emptive Arrests May Not Meet Tough Court Standards, WALL ST. J. CLASS-
ROOM ED., Oct. 8, 2002 ("[Alt a bail hearing in Buffalo, N.Y., U.S. Magistrate Judge H.
Kenneth Schroeder Jr. will consider how much of a threat is posed by six Yemeni-Ameri-
cans charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization) availa-
ble at http://www.wsjclassroom.com/wsjtoday/archive/O2oct/O2octO8_terror.htm;
Citizens Arrested: Six Indicted for Plotting Against U.S., ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 5, 2003 (six
individuals, including five U.S. citizens, indicted on charges of providing material sup-
port to foreign terrorist organizations and contributing services to al Qaeda and the
Taliban) available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/bust021OO4.html;
Professor Protests Arrest with Hunger Strike, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 25, 2003 (Sami Al-
Arian, along with three other men, were charged with "raising money to finance suicide
bombings and other attacks by the group Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel and the
occupied territories"); U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Statement of the Attorney
General: Indictments, Feb. 20, 2003 ("This indictment charges that these named defend-
ants [including A-Arian] were 'material supporters' of a foreign terrorist organization.
The financed, extolled, and assisted acts of terror") available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
ag/speeches/2003/02202003pressconference.htm; see Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak,
Threats and Responses, N. Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 2003, at Al.
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tion to prevention. The primary goal is no longer conviction but detention
and interrogation. Federal criminal prosecution, considered inadequate by
itself to achieve these goals, is viewed as merely one weapon in a detention
arsenal that includes material witness warrants, secret deportation pro-
ceedings and, relying on the president's war power, military detention of
those designated as "unlawful enemy combatants."
66
Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was initially arrested on a material witness
warrant in May of 2002, in Chicago, far from any war zone.6 7 Shortly
thereafter, however, he was transferred into the custody of the Department
of Defense and has been held since in a Navy brig in Charleston, South
Carolina as an "enemy combatant."6 8 The government has also suggested
that it is prepared to rely on the "enemy combatant" designation in other
circumstances when expedient. Had the judge in the Lackwanna case
decided to grant bail to the defendants, for example, the government
reportedly would likely have transferred them to military custody.
69
The government has taken the position in the Padilla case that, since
Mr. Padilla was being held as an "enemy combatant" pursuant to the Presi-
dent's war power, his detention is not subject to habeas review, and he has
no right to counsel. In a decision issued in December of 2002 now on
appeal in the Second Circuit, Judge Mukasey of the Southern District of
New York rejected that opinion, holding that Mr. Padilla has the right to
consult with counsel and to submit facts and argument in support of his
habeas petition.70 In the wake of the Fourth Circuit's decision a little more
than a month earlier in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, denying counsel to another
detained "enemy combatant,"7 ' the Padilla court's decision was regarded
66. Relying on use of the term, unlawful enemy combatants, in Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 48 (1942), the government has taken the position that those suspected of terror-
ism, at least those suspected of association with al Qaeda, are "unlawful enemy combat-
ants." As "enemy combatants" in an active war they can be held as prisoners without the
necessity of criminal charges; as "unlawful" combatants, they are not entitled to the
rights of prisoners of war under international law. Id. at 31. In Ex parte Quirin, eight
alleged German saboteurs, including one who claimed to be a U.S. citizen, were tried
and convicted in a military tribunal. The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
military tribunal. The defendants were convicted and sentenced to death within sixty
days of the commencement of the proceedings; six of the eight were executed by the
electric chair shortly thereafter. The Dark History of a Military Tribunal, Quirin Revis-
ited, 24 NAT'L L.J. at A17 (extensive discussion).
67. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.2d 564, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
68. Id. at 569.
69. Stewart Powell, Terror Suspects 'Enemies?'; Bush May Order Lackawanna Men Held
in Military Custody, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Sept. 21, 2002, at D02 ("President George W.
Bush could order the American terror suspects arrested in western New York into indefi-
nite military custody without trial if new information warrants designating them as
enemy combatants"').
70. Padilla, 233 F. Supp.2d at 569.
71. Yaser Hamdi, like Jose Padilla, is apparently a U.S. citizen. Unlike Jose Padilla,
Mr. Hamdi was taken into custody in a war zone, after having emerged with John Walker
Lindh and 82 others from the basement of the Qala-iJanghi fortress in Afghanistan after
an uprising of prisoners held by Northern Alliance warlord General Rashid Dostum.
The Fourth Circuit, overruling district court judge Robert Doumar, held that Hamdi was
not entitled to counsel or to challenge the government's hearsay declaration by which
his detention had been justified, because it was "undisputed that he was captured in an
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by some as a victory for the due process rights of those detained in the war
on terrorism. 72
Overlooked in the celebration over affirmation of the right to counsel,
however, were the court's decisions impacting the merits of the case. Sig-
nificantly, the court held that "Padilla's detention is not per se unlawful;"
pursuant to his constitutional war power and the Congressional resolution
authorizing the use of military force against the perpetrators of 9/11, the
President, through the Defense Department, has the power to detain those
he determines to be associated with the perpetrators. 73 In reaching that
decision, the court took clear note of the government's new policy of
emphasizing prevention over punishment. The court quoted at length Sec-
retary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, commenting on the purpose of
Padilla's detention:
It seems to me that the problem in the United States is that we have-we are
in a certain mode. Our normal procedure is that if somebody does some-
thing unlawful, illegal against our system of government, that the first thing
that we want to do is apprehend them, then try them in a court and then
punish them. In this case that is not our first interest.... Our interest is to-
we are not interested in trying him at the moment; we are not interested in
punishing him at the moment. We are interested in finding out what he
knows .... So I think what our country and other countries have to think of
is, what is your priority today? And given the power of weapons and given
the number of terrorists that exist in our world, our approach has to [be] to
try to protect the American people, and provide information to friendly
countries and allies, and protect deployed forces from those kind of
attacks.
74
Perhaps more troubling than the court's affirmation of the President's
right to detain in military custody U.S. citizens captured on U.S. soil
outside of any combat zone, is the standard articulated by the court for
such detention. The court will not "decid[e] de novo whether Padilla is
associated with al Qaeda and whether he should therefore be detained as
an unlawful combatant" but will only determine "whether there is some
evidence to support [the President's] conclusion" to that effect. 75 In reach-
ing this holding, the Padilla court relied on the resolution of Congress
"authoriz[ing] the President to use necessary and appropriate force in
order, among other things, 'to prevent any future acts of international ter-
rorism against the United States."' 76
[sic] zone of active combat operations abroad," and the executive, therefore, had a legally
valid basis to detain him. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003). With
direct reference to the Padilla case, however, the Fourth Circuit eschewed "any broad or
categorical holdings on enemy combatant designations" and noted that it had "no occa-
sion, for example, to address the designation as an enemy combatant of an American
citizen captured on American soil or the role that counsel might play in such a proceed-
ing." Id. at 465.
72. See supra, note 9.
73. Padilla, 233 F. Supp.2d at 569.
74. Id. at 574.
75. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 590 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a)).
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The Padilla decision thus comes very close to saying that the executive
can imprison indefinitely anyone whom it has some basis to suspect of
associating with terrorists. "Some evidence" of associating with al Qaeda
is a far cry from probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed,
let alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It has been nearly a year since
Mr. Padilla was taken into custody, and one suspects that the government
has by this time exhausted his use as a source of intelligence on potential
future attacks. It seems unlikely, moreover, that if there were reliable evi-
dence of criminal conduct on his part that he would not have been charged
with his crimes by now. As an "enemy combatant," however, he can appar-
ently be imprisoned indefinitely-as long, that is, as the war on terrorism
continues-based on nothing more than suspicion of association with ter-
rorists and "some evidence" to support that suspicion.
III. Civil Liberty, War, and Fear
There is, of course, precedent for preventive detention outside the bounds
of the criminal justice system in time of war. As the authors point out, in a
section entitled "Repeating History," in World War I we imprisoned dissi-
dents for merely speaking out against the war; and, in World War II, with
the Supreme Court's approval, "we interned 110,000 persons, over two-
thirds of whom were U.S. citizens, not because of individualized determina-
tions that they posed a threat to national security or the war effort, but
solely for their Japanese ancestry. '7 7
As Chief Justice Rehnquist has reminded us, "law is silent in time of
war."78  By transforming its anti-terrorism policy from the "criminal
model" urged by the authors to a "war model" not fully anticipated by the
authors, the administration has played a powerful card against those who
would use the courts to reign in its authority. Unlike the threat posed to
our national security and consequently to our civil liberties in World Wars
I and II, however, the current war on terrorism conjures the prospect of
being at perpetual war and courts being perpetually silent in the face of
executive actions in the name of prevention and national security. Ironi-
cally, to the degree that present policies fail to prevent future attacks, fur-
ther incursions on civil liberties in the name of national security will
undoubtedly gain momentum from the resulting national apprehension
and fear. One shudders to imagine the impact on civil liberties of another
attack of the magnitude of 9/11.
Certainly the case can be made and is being made by those with the
administration's ear that we are genuinely at war with the perpetrators of
terrorism, albeit a war of a new and different kind, and that the criminal
justice system is simply not equipped to deal by itself with the current
77. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 150.
78. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (Vin-
tage 2000); William H. Rehnquist, The Use of Military Tribunals, D.C. Circuit Judicial
Conference, Remarks of the Chief Justice (June 14, 2002), available at http:www.supreme
courtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_06-14-02.html.
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threat of terrorism. Moreover, even World Wars I and II, with their histo-
ries of excesses in the name of national security, did not result in repeated
or extensive attacks on U.S. soil, let alone attacks perpetrated by those who
hide among us. One wishes that the authors of Terrorism, perhaps with the
benefit of post-9/11 developments since their publication date, had taken
on more directly the arguments for the uniqueness of the present
circumstance.
Whichever side of the debate one takes, however, it should be
acknowledged, as the authors so ably illuminate, that principles fundamen-
tal to our system of justice are at stake. Those principles include the sepa-
ration of powers between the executive and the judiciary, the presumption
of innocence of those accused of criminal conduct and the principle of
individual culpability rather than guilt by association. At the height of the
Cold War and our confrontation with the perceived threat of domination
by the international communist movement led by the Soviet Union, Justice
Warren wrote for the Supreme Court in United States v. Robel:
For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular pride in the demo-
cratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the most cherished of those
ideals have found expression in the First Amendment. It would indeed be
ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion
of one of those liberties-the freedom of association-which makes the
defense of the Nation worthwhile. 79
By charting the historical pendulum of infringement on civil liberty in
the name of national security, Terrorism attempts to provide historical con-
text to the present debate over the proper response to the threat of terror-
ism and to exhort us to avoid the excesses of the past. Implicit in that
perspective is the assumption that the pendulum will continue to swing
back and forth. If we are truly entering an era of perpetual struggle against
terrorism marked by increasing national insecurity and fear, however, one
is left to wonder how far the pendulum may swing and what will reverse its
course.
79. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
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